By David A. Powell
copyright 2024
Savas Beatie
I have not read David Powell’s highly regarded Chickamauga trilogy but online praise for it and h his writing is difficult to miss and I have seen much of it. After reading this volume, however, I better understand how his books gained so many glowing reviews.
This is simply an outstanding work that I greatly enjoyed.
What struck me most about this work is that it is far more than just a recounting of events that happened 160+ years ago; it is a true history, going beyond the “what” happened and exploring the other basic questions of research - who, when, where, and why - in an enjoyable, easy-to-read narrative. This volume is a deeply-researched, organized, and detailed analysis of those basic questions, all formatted in a manner that adds to the book’s readability.
One early example of the analysis that I found noteworthy occurs on pages 238-240 with a discussion of what went wrong for the Federals during the action at Snake Creek Gap, which other options were available and how those other choices may have worked better than what took place. It moves into a discussion of similar issues with the Confederate forces as well, trying to explain Joe Johnston's thoughts and actions during this affair. Similar discussions occur throughout the book during each of the movements and engagements discussed here, pointing out mistakes, misunderstandings, and other questionable actions from both sides, as well as suggesting other ideas the armies could have adopted. One example is the discussion of a Union organizational issue of coordination between units mentioned on page 256.
This book, however, is not just a bunch of second-guessing and blame-laying; the author also acknowledges good decisions and performances when justified, such as on page 357 when he noted that an attack that John Logan's men made was successful "due to careful observations and preparations."
Besides the analysis of the actions and decisions of the commanders and armies involved, one noticeable strength of the book is its organization. The use of footnotes on each page instead of endnotes, is particularly notable and certainly a plus. The Snake Creek discussion mentioned before is just one example where such notes add insight and information. They are much easier to follow than are endnotes that require flipping back and forth, sometimes between hundreds of pages.
This work starts off strongly, making a good first impression with an introductory section entitled Dramatist Personae, which introduces the primary actors in the play that follows.
It then touches on some early military action in the region, weeks before the generally accepted campaign start date of early May and continues to examine the leaders who would make the decisions in the upcoming weeks, such as a review of the team of U.S. Grant and William Sherman as their roles and responsibilities changed in the months before this contest started, as well as the Army of Tennessee’s leadership change from Braxton Bragg to Joseph Johnston. The author then examines the morale and condition of the men and armies that would soon face each other. Overall, the initial eight chapters perform a valuable duty in setting the stage for the upcoming battlefield drama.
I also enjoyed the decision to include many short chapters instead of fewer long ones. This adds to the readability and helps the narrative to flow smoothly and match the battlefield events as they developed.
Starting with chapter nine, the text switches focus to the actual military happenings of the start of the campaign, including the choices, maneuvers, and fighting that made up the first three weeks of this long contest. It is within these chapters that this work perhaps shines brightest. The details of the events of the campaign combine with analysis of these stories and sources to weave a mountain of information into a functioning and readable book.
The author used many sources - period records, writings, articles, and publications, along with modern scholarly works and others - to uncover information, but finding those reports means little without an understanding of what they mean. To me, the analysis and interpretation of the sources is among the most impressive pieces of this work - how he combines so many sources, often containing conflicting or sometimes missing information (such as the attempts to calculate casualties of the engagements), with his interpretation, to create a cohesive narrative of the story of this campaign. Even when sources are not clear, he explains why he uses them or interprets them a certain way. What first grabbed my attention in this regard was footnote 3 on page 322, when he acknowledges the possibly questionable credibility of a journal, but chose to use it as he believed that section of the writing to be accurate. Similar situations take place later in this work as well. To me this was a bit like “seeing how the sausage is made” - the author did not just find a source and automatically accept it, but, instead, analyzed it while acknowledging that some uncertainty exists, showing the readers why he included that information instead of just letting it go unquestioned. That hints at the type of thought and effort that went into this project.
One part of this book that did catch me off guard was the unexpected appearance of chapter 27, "Supplying Sherman: "I Will Eat Your Mules." It is a noteworthy section of the book, full of important information about the logistics of Sherman's planned campaign and the potential challenges thereof. What surprised me was that it immediately followed eighteen chapters of military action and proceeded five other such sections. This placement in the midst of the discussion of the movements and clashes of the armies confused me. It would have been terrific, perhaps ideal, as chapter 9, between the talk of the men and the the fields where they met, as part of the setup to the campaign, or perhaps at the end of the book, after the talk of the fighting and right before the final chapter, but as I read the book it seemingly came out of nowhere and then disappeared again. Perhaps I am overlooking some painfully obvious reason for its placement, and I do not intend this as heavy criticism, more of an admission of my own confusion, a minor blip in a terrific work. That said, it is one of the better chapters of the book, so I am much more pleased that it is included than I am surprised by when and where it came.
Chapter 33, “Assessment,” also deserves acknowledgement. As its name declares, it wraps up the military situation of the campaign as of May 19. It is the logical and ideal way to conclude a work like this. It includes a noteworthy wrap-up of the Confederate behavior at Cassville, “the most enigmatic incident” of the campaign to this point. The indecision at this town was “a quintessential Army of Tennessee moment: confusion among the army’s leadership, plans going awry, arguments, and in the end, another morale-destroying retreat.” (p.545). That type of description fills much of this book,
This chapter also looks at the Union performance to this point as well, though with a more positive outlook, reflecting the results of the confrontations up to this stage of the fight for Atlanta.
A helpful order of battle, always important in a battle or campaign study, then follows, as do the bibliography and the index.
This book is long, 545 pages through the final chapter, before the order of battle, bibliography, and index, but I found it to be a quick read. More importantly, though, it is an extremely good read, and I expect others will enjoy it as well. Even knowing there are four more volumes to follow, and the possible future commitment that implies, this is certainly a work that those who enjoy studying the Civil War should read.
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