What I Unexpectedly Learned About the 23rd Kentucky Infantry

Like what I presume virtually all Civil War students or enthusiasts do, I read about the Civil War to learn more about it and hopefully, enjoy some good writing. Sometimes, however, books take readers in unexpected directions. Such an instance for me occurred while reading volume 2 of David Powell's series on the Atlanta Campaign (see my thoughts on it here), a work that pleasantly surprised me by including details that apply to my own research, information unlike anything I had seen previously.

A few years ago, when I began my project exploring Campbell County, Kentucky in the Civil War, I started my research by identifying soldiers from the area, focusing on their individual lives and service. One of my first finds was that more than 150 of these men had enlisted in the 23rd Kentucky Infantry. I was caught off-guard to see so many names in one unit, but it was a good early discovery, a sign that I would find more information than I expected at the time.

Since then, any mention of the 23rd grabs my attention, but while I try to maintain a basic understanding of the unit’s record, I honestly spend much more effort looking into the individual soldiers than on the details of battles and military maneuvering.

The 23rd marched and fought in most of the largest fights and campaigns in the Western Theater of the war, from their reserve role in Thomas Crittenden's II Corps at Perryville, to active fighting at Stones River, Chickamauga, and the Atlanta Campaign, plus involvement with the Tullahoma Campaign, a difficult task despite the lack of bloodshed during it. As I continued to read about these fights and campaigns, I never really saw any especially memorable descriptions of their work. They fought and suffered casualties in various battles but usually came off as supporting players in most battles (though maybe I’m still missing something about another fight.)

Eventually I learned about the fight at Brown’s Ferry, Tennessee in October of 1863, where the Federals began to work to get more supplies to their troops in Chattanooga. The 23rd took a leading part in this battle, with some of its soldiers being the first men to land on the Confederate-held western bank of the Tennessee River. This lesser-known contest was a Union success, allowing the opening of what was quickly dubbed the "Cracker Line." Until now, I took that contest as being their most notable action, but some fighting on Georgia soil may change that view.

In chapter 8 of this book, Powell explores the Battle of Pickett’s Mill on May 27, 1864. I was not familiar with the details of this contest, but perhaps that lack of knowledge left me more excited when I learned that the 23rd (in William Hazen’s brigade of Thomas Woods’ division of the IV Army Corps commanded by Oliver Howard) was among the Federal units at the front of this fight. This work gives a terrific recap of this fight, painting a picture of what a tough contest it was and the many challenges the men, including in the 23rd, faced.

From battlefields.org

I started dog-earing the pages in this chapter, so now that section of my book is full of bent corners, but I don’t care. I certainly will re-read that chapter, maybe soon.

Additionally, I had never before realized that Ambrose Bierce’s The Crime at Pickett’s Mill was about the action Hazen’s men, including the 23rd, saw. I guess I had not read it since I started paying attention to the 23rd. His essay must be the most literary account of any of the 23rd’s fighting from the entire war. I have not seen any regimental history of the 23rd, or even any writings by local soldiers describing their work. Heck, even Spared & Shared appears to have nothing from the regiment, so Bierce’s essay is a nice perspective to have.

More good fortune soon fell into my lap in the shape of a pair of National Tribune stories written by members of the 23rd. (I also have an article from that newspaper about the regiment at Chickamauga, written by the same lieutenant who authored one of these reports. It is quite long, so I’ll have to re-read it.

I planned to discuss these accounts in this post, but that will take quite a bit of space, so I’ll make a separate post. Combined with Powell's work and Bierce’s account, I stumbled upon intriguing new information for my research. (And I do know that here is a book concerning this battle, a new title now on my list of future acquisitions.)

I would not have seen any of these details had I not read this book. I certainly did not expect to find information relevant to my project in a book on the Atlanta Campaign. Discoveries like this are one of the joys of reading. You never know what you might find.

A Few Thoughts on The Atlanta Campaign, Volume 2

Atlanta Campaign Volume 2 : From the Etowah River to Kennesaw Mountain, May 20 to June 27, 1864
David A. Powell
Copyright 2025
Savas Beatie

In the study of the Civil War, reading books is still a primary way of learning more about it. Some of the many books on the subject deliver exactly what readers want, while others fall short of hopes, and a few even manage to exceed expectations.

This book exceeded what I hoped to read, as it revealed information relevant to my own research, a most pleasant surprise that certainly influences my opinion of this work.

Aside from that personal benefit (which I will discuss more in a later post), this book is just what readers have come to expect from this author. It is a detailed, heavily-researched exploration of not only the battlefield encounters, but also the maneuvering and countermoves of the opposing forces, the decision making, and the mistakes both sides made or opportunities they missed. It recounts what happened and analyzes of this stretch of the campaign. 

One feature that especially grabbed my attention is the heavier-than-usual focus on the formations that companies, regiments, brigades, and divisions employed when moving into battles. Maybe I have overlooked this in past books, but it struck me bluntly in this one, especially when Powell explained what these formations were and their suitability (or lack thereof) for the situation instead of just mentioning them. This really brought home how moving to face the enemy force was more than just heading straight towards it. It also magnified the work that officers did to start these maneuvers and attempt to keep them in order as the men approached the enemy. Terrain features such as woods, thick undergrowth, and waterways, along with man-made obstacles such as fences or felled trees, left these movements even more difficult for the soldiers to perform in the face of the enemy.

The confusion in battle as units tried to overcome these barriers and unfamiliarity with the ground to reach assigned locations or to even to know which company or regiment was next to them in the midst of this chaos comes through clearly on these pages, which even depict a diagram of the "column of division" deployment a regiment would use, right as the text describes this formation.

For those who are not experts on Civil War tactics (I raise my hand) this focus is a welcome discussion.

Powell also pays significant attention to numbers, such as the sizes of the armies and their regiments, brigades, divisions, and corps, especially right before battles. How many men were attacking or defending against how many enemies is obviously crucial information in battle studies and receives much attention on these pages.

The total casualties these units suffered during the fighting is also a frequent topic. Such data is not always easily found, especially on the Confederate side, where reports - if they even existed - were frequently lost to history. Assembling these numbers as accurately as possible was obviously a priority. Due to lack of reports or sources, the author occasionally uses his own estimates of these figures, especially battle losses, but he does provide the basis for his deductions. Analysis of such issues is strength of this book. 

This is, unsurprisingly, a stellar examination of this stretch of the fight for Atlanta, not only looking at the fights and movements, but the leaders as well. William Sherman does not come out of it looking especially good, though part of that is that the book ended at the Federals’ failed attack on Kennesaw Mountain. From his perspective, this book ended on a sour note, leaving a bad final impression.

James B. McPherson comes off as being too tentative, even when Sherman ordered him to attack and he agreed to it.

On the Confederate side, Joseph E Johnston may have missed opportunities to transition from defense to offense and exploit Federal weaknesses, and he and Rebel leaders also had problems communicating clearly and concisely, such as expressing how heavy enemy forces facing them truly were. Attacks sometimes happened or did not happen based on uncertain or incorrect information. 

This book certainly deserves a place on Civil War bookshelves and in the hands of those who enjoy studying the war. It is another high-quality work that examines its subject in great depth, a fine telling of these few weeks of this crucial campaign.

My 1st Confederate Ancestor: Levi Gross, 5th Ky Mounted Infantry

One topic I’ve discussed over the years on this page has involved the exploration of the lives and service of Civil War ancestors I discovered, and I even have created  a separate page  to list them and provide some basic information about them their places in my lineage.

Recently a cousin found another link to the war, but this one was different - this one was a Confederate soldier, the first of his kind in my family history.

--

Levi Gross, my first cousin five times removed, was born in 1844 in Breathitt County, Kentucky to Thomas and Sally (McIntosh) Gross, the latter of whom was my 4 times great grandaunt (the sister of my 4x great-grandfather.)

The family remained in Breathitt County - from where many of my maternal ancestors lived - in  both 1850 and 1860.

When the Civil War started in April of 1861, Levi did mot immediately enlist, perhaps due to his age, as he was under 18 years of age. Many young men found ways around this regulation, but Levi did not.

By September of 1862, he had turned 18 and on September 11 ventured to the county seat of Jackson, where he enlisted as a private in company B of the 5th Kentucky Mounted Infantry. Breathitt County, like much of Kentucky, contained divided loyalties, a two of Levi's first cousins (my 3x great grandfather Nimrod McIntosh and his brother Richard) joined U.S. units.

Levi's regiment had originally formed in the summer of 1861 as a one-year unit, though many of its men refused to re-enlist for the rest of the war. 

His wartime experience was not always happy. In October of 1862, he deserted his company at Saylersville, Kentucky, and did not return until April of 1863, when General William Preston had him restored to duty. He forfeited all pay for the time he was gone, a fairly lenient but common punishment.

As the war progressed, the 5th Kentucky eventually became part of the famous Orphan Brigade, a collection of Kentucky regiments and men who served the Confederacy but never fought in their home state. These men fought in the September 1863 contest at Chickamauga in northern Georgia, the largest and bloodiest battle in the war's Western Theater, an overwhelming Confederate triumph.

A form dated in February of 1864 reports him as being “destitute” of a pair of pants, a pair of drawers, and a blanket. A special requisition apparently resolved that issue. Levi “made his mark” on the requisition document.

His records also show that he owed $3 in April of that year due to “damage done to gun.” Unfortunately, it does not specify the type of gun it was.

Levi and his fellow orphans  then joined in the famous Atlanta Campaign through the spring and summer of 1864, a long, hard-fought series of contests that led Levi to his unfortunate destiny. (Some might contend it did the same for the Confederacy.)

As the year  progressed, the Federal and Rebel armies were still contesting Georgia soil, and on July 22,  William Hardee’s Corps of Confederates met Federals near a waterway called Intrenchment Creek  Hardee’s men attacked, but the bluecoats defeated them. 

Among the Orphan Brigade’s casualties was Levi Gross, who was injured and left on the field, where his Yankees recovered him and moved him to the hospital of the second division of their XVI Corps.

Despite this attempted care, his wound proved to be fatal and he passed away on September 14, 1864. He is buried in the Marietta Confederate Cemetery, his name engraved on a monument with 18 fellow Confederate casualties. (Not only is he my first CSA ancestor, but is also just my second ancestor to have fought and died in the war.)

His father Thomas Gross (who had married into my family tree) also served the Confederacy, joining the 5th Regiment, Kentucky Cavalry, which formed in the summer of 1862. Like his son, he became a casualty of war, though with better fortune than Levi as Union forces led by Colonel Frank Wolford’s 1st Kentucky Cavalry captured Thomas in Richmond, Ky., around July 30 or August 1, during the small engagement mentioned toward the end of this page.)

He spent time at a military prison in Louisville, then at both McLean Barracks and Kemper Barracks in Cincinnati, followed by stays at Camp Chase in Columbus, Ohio and Rock Island, Illinois, where he took the Oath of Allegiance on October 24, 1864.

 He survived his confinement and the war, but not for terribly long. He died on September 24, 1864, two years after his son succumbed to his war wounds. Thomas was buried in the Combs Cemetery in Breathitt County.   

Book Review: The Atlanta Campaign, Volume I, Dalton to Cassville, May 1-19, 1864

 

The Atlanta Campaign: Volume I: Dalton to Cassville, May 1-19, 1864
By David A. Powell
copyright 2024
Savas Beatie

I have not read David Powell’s highly regarded Chickamauga trilogy but online praise for it and h his writing is difficult to miss and I have seen much of it. After reading this volume, however,  I better understand how his books gained so many glowing reviews.

This is simply an outstanding work that I greatly enjoyed.

What struck me most about this work is that it is far more than just a recounting of events that happened 160+ years ago; it is a true history, going beyond the “what” happened and exploring the other basic questions of research - who, when, where, and why - in an enjoyable, easy-to-read narrative. This volume is a deeply-researched, organized, and detailed analysis of those basic questions, all formatted in a manner that adds to the book’s readability.

One early example of the analysis that I found noteworthy occurs on pages 238-240 with a discussion of what went wrong for the Federals during the action at Snake Creek Gap, which other options were available and how those other choices may have worked better than what took place. It moves into a discussion of similar issues with the Confederate forces as well, trying to explain Joe Johnston's thoughts and actions during this affair. Similar discussions occur throughout the book during each of the movements and engagements discussed here, pointing out mistakes, misunderstandings, and other questionable actions from both sides, as well as suggesting other ideas the armies could have adopted.  One example is the discussion of a Union organizational issue of coordination between units mentioned on page 256. 

This book, however, is not just a bunch of second-guessing and blame-laying; the author also acknowledges good decisions and performances when justified, such as on page 357 when he noted that an attack that John Logan's men made was successful "due to careful observations and preparations." 

Besides the analysis of the actions and decisions of the commanders and armies involved, one noticeable strength of the book is its organization. The use of footnotes on each page instead of endnotes, is particularly notable and certainly a plus. The Snake Creek discussion mentioned before is just one example where such notes add insight and information. They are much easier to follow than are endnotes that require flipping back and forth, sometimes between hundreds of pages.

This work starts off strongly, making a good first impression with an introductory section entitled Dramatist Personae, which introduces the primary actors in the play that follows. 

It then touches on some early military action in the region, weeks before the generally accepted campaign start date of early May and continues to examine the leaders who would make the decisions in the upcoming weeks, such as a review of the team of U.S. Grant and William Sherman as their roles and responsibilities changed in the months before this contest started, as well as the Army of Tennessee’s leadership change from Braxton Bragg to Joseph Johnston. The author then examines the morale and condition of the men and armies that would soon face each other. Overall, the initial eight chapters perform a valuable duty in setting the stage for the upcoming battlefield drama.

I also enjoyed the decision to include many short chapters instead of fewer long ones. This adds to the readability and helps the narrative to flow smoothly and match the battlefield events as they developed.

Starting with chapter nine, the text switches focus to the actual military happenings of the start of the campaign, including the choices, maneuvers, and fighting that made up the first three weeks of this long contest. It is within these chapters that this work perhaps shines brightest. The details of the events of the campaign combine with analysis of these stories and sources to weave a mountain of information into a functioning and readable book.

The author used many sources - period records, writings, articles, and publications, along with modern scholarly works and others - to uncover information, but finding those reports means little without an understanding of what they mean. To me, the analysis and interpretation of the sources is among the most impressive pieces of this work - how he combines so many sources, often containing conflicting or sometimes missing information (such as the attempts to calculate casualties of the engagements), with his interpretation, to create a cohesive narrative of the story of this campaign. Even when sources are not clear, he explains why he uses them or interprets them a certain way. What first grabbed my attention in this regard was footnote 3 on page 322, when he acknowledges the possibly questionable credibility of a journal, but chose to use it as he believed that section of the writing to be accurate. Similar situations take place later in this work as well. To me this was a bit like “seeing how the sausage is made” - the author did not just find a source and automatically accept it, but, instead, analyzed it while acknowledging that some uncertainty exists, showing the readers why he included that information instead of just letting it go unquestioned. That hints at the type of thought and effort that went into this project.

One part of this book that did catch me off guard was the unexpected appearance of chapter 27, "Supplying Sherman: "I Will Eat Your Mules." It is a noteworthy section of the book, full of important information about the logistics of Sherman's planned campaign and the potential challenges thereof. What surprised me was that it immediately followed eighteen chapters of military action and proceeded five other such sections. This placement in the midst of the discussion of the movements and clashes of the armies confused me. It would have been terrific, perhaps ideal, as chapter 9, between the talk of the men and the the fields where they met, as part of the setup to the campaign, or perhaps at the end of the book, after the talk of the fighting and right before the final chapter, but as I read the book it seemingly came out of nowhere and then disappeared again. Perhaps I am overlooking some painfully obvious reason for its placement, and I do not intend this as heavy criticism, more of an admission of my own confusion, a minor blip in a terrific work. That said, it is one of the better chapters of the book, so I am much more pleased that it is included than I am surprised by when and where it came. 

Chapter 33, “Assessment,” also deserves acknowledgement. As its name declares, it wraps up the military situation of the campaign as of May 19. It is the logical and ideal way to conclude a work like this. It includes a noteworthy wrap-up of the Confederate behavior at Cassville, “the most enigmatic incident” of the campaign to this point. The indecision at this town was “a quintessential Army of Tennessee moment: confusion among the army’s leadership, plans going awry, arguments, and in the end, another morale-destroying retreat.” (p.545). That type of description fills much of this book,

This chapter also looks at the Union performance to this point as well, though with a more positive outlook, reflecting the results of the confrontations up to this stage of the fight for Atlanta.

A helpful order of battle, always important in a battle or campaign study, then follows, as do the bibliography and the index. 

This book is long,  545 pages through the final chapter, before the order of battle, bibliography, and index, but I found it to be a quick read.  More importantly, though, it is an extremely good read, and I expect others will enjoy it as well. Even knowing there are four more volumes to follow, and the possible future commitment that implies, this is certainly a work that those who enjoy studying the Civil War should read.

Book Discussion: Antietam Crossroads of Freedom

Antietam: Crossroads of Freedom: The Battle that Changed the Course of the Civil War

James M. McPherson 

copyright 2002

Oxford University Press

 

When I buy a book, I usually read it, then place it back on my shelf. Occasionally I will grab a book to try to find a phrase or claim I remember in the book or to clarify my memory on some subject, but very rare is the book that I read a second time.

Antietam: Crossroads of Freedom became one of those rare books. I read and enjoyed it a few years ago, but have now just re-read it as part of the "Let's Talk about it: Making Sense of the American Civil War" series I have mentioned here before. 

As expected, this book is very readable and informative, written in a style as most of McPherson's books are. It is only 156 pages long as well, so it is a quick read too.

I've entitled this post as a "discussion" instead of a review as I expect this to be more of an exploration of my thoughts of the message of the book than of a more traditional review. I'll try to keep it at a reasonable length and not touch on most of the many other points that can contribute to these thoughts. (I'm even leaving out any talk of  Gettysburg as the turning point - please pick yourselves up off the floor after reading that if the shock overcomes you.)

My main question about this book is if Antietam is truly the turning point of the war as McPherson contends. He does a good job of showing the mood in the north in the months before the war, with the great concern after the failure of the Peninsula Campaign and the route of Second Bull Run. Some leaders in Great Britain and other European countries were watching events closely and momentum seemed to be favoring either recognition of the Confederacy by those countries, or intervention into the war. 

Then Lee's army invaded Maryland. That should have been no way to improve Northern morale.

At this point, the book describes the action of the battle itself, from the famous "lost orders" to George McClellan's equally famous lack of aggressiveness. McPherson shows how that, even before the battle, the Union forces had experienced a sudden improvement in their morale, and were ready for the challenge of a battle on what they considered their territory. This contributed to the ferocity of the fighting, and after the fighting ended, many Union survivors were ready to pursue their enemy and try to inflict even more punishment on them.

McPherson then presents his arguments about Antietam's importance to the outcome of the war, and they are familiar - the Confederates returned to Virginia, Lincoln had the opportunity to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, and foreign recognition of the Confederacy suddenly became unlikely, if not impossible.

They are good, strong arguments, but I'm not sure I agree with them. 

For one, the war was only one-and-a-half years old when this fight took place, yet lasted two-and-a-half years more afterwards. Can it be a turning point if the event lasts longer after it occurs? 

I suppose that raises the question of what is a turning point, as well as the difference between A turning point and THE turning point. 

Also, if Antietam is a turning point because it ended the hopes of foreign recognition of the Confederacy, that implies an assumption that the Confederacy could only win the war with such recognition. Though time proved the Confederates did not get such recognition and did not win the war, I am not convinced that the failure to obtain such recognition doomed the Confederacy. I believe they still had the possibility of gaining victory without foreign intervention. During the summer and early fall of 1864, the Confederates had inflicted many casualties on Union forces in Virginia and had frustrated their foes elsewhere, particularly in the Union's attempt to approach Atlanta. Europe did not offer recognition, but the Confederate armies still bogged the Union armies down and the lack of progress on the part of the Northern forces frustrated and aggravated people at home. Doubt about the war's outcome began to build, and even President Lincoln looked unfavorably at his chances of re-election.

I can understand listing Antietam as one of many turning points in the war, though perhaps that cheapens the importance of whatever is meant by "turning point." In the discussion of THE turning point, my interpretation is of THE moment or event after which Union victory was inevitable. In that regard, I turn back to the middle and end of 1864, and contend that Lincoln's re-election in 1864 was the key event in showing that the Union would prevail. William T. Sherman's capture of Atlanta certainly aided Lincoln's re-election and I have often thought that event was the key, but now I believe the actual election result was the symbol and sign that the northern people were not succumbing to war-weariness; they did not elect a candidate whose party favored peace at almost any cost; they decided to continue fighting until success came.  This spirit displayed by the Northern people dismayed many in the south, and destroyed Southern hopes that the Confederacy could win simply by outlasting the north. The supposed "mechanics" "hirelings" and "wage slaves" of the North had shown a more persistent fighting spirit than their enemies had expected.

That - the failure to injure Northern morale badly enough to convince Northerners to give up on the war - was more important than the failure to get European of the Confederacy as a separate nation. Or at least it was as important, but it was not, at least in my understanding, less important to the Confederacy's chances of victory.

Of course, the "turning point" issue is one of the many questions that will in all likelihood always spur debate on the Civil War and McPherson's book does add to that discussion. It may create new thoughts and perspective too. In high school, I bought the "Gettysburg as the high-water mark" turning-point view, have sometimes accepted the points McPherson makes in his book about Antietam and its aftermath, and have also given thought to Sherman's Atlanta campaign as the so-called "turning point" before settling (at least for now) on Lincoln's re-election as the true key "moment" that demonstrated how the war would eventually end. 

Although I may not agree now  with McPherson's arguments, I thoroughly enjoyed this book and his analysis. I'm glad I read it again and look forward to the discussion it creates at our next "Let's Talk About it" session tomorrow night.