Book Review: The Atlanta Campaign, Volume I, Dalton to Cassville, May 1-19, 1864

 

The Atlanta Campaign: Volume I: Dalton to Cassville, May 1-19, 1864
By David A. Powell
copyright 2024
Savas Beatie

I have not read David Powell’s highly regarded Chickamauga trilogy but online praise for it and h his writing is difficult to miss and I have seen much of it. After reading this volume, however,  I better understand how his books gained so many glowing reviews.

This is simply an outstanding work that I greatly enjoyed.

What struck me most about this work is that it is far more than just a recounting of events that happened 160+ years ago; it is a true history, going beyond the “what” happened and exploring the other basic questions of research - who, when, where, and why - in an enjoyable, easy-to-read narrative. This volume is a deeply-researched, organized, and detailed analysis of those basic questions, all formatted in a manner that adds to the book’s readability.

One early example of the analysis that I found noteworthy occurs on pages 238-240 with a discussion of what went wrong for the Federals during the action at Snake Creek Gap, which other options were available and how those other choices may have worked better than what took place. It moves into a discussion of similar issues with the Confederate forces as well, trying to explain Joe Johnston's thoughts and actions during this affair. Similar discussions occur throughout the book during each of the movements and engagements discussed here, pointing out mistakes, misunderstandings, and other questionable actions from both sides, as well as suggesting other ideas the armies could have adopted.  One example is the discussion of a Union organizational issue of coordination between units mentioned on page 256. 

This book, however, is not just a bunch of second-guessing and blame-laying; the author also acknowledges good decisions and performances when justified, such as on page 357 when he noted that an attack that John Logan's men made was successful "due to careful observations and preparations." 

Besides the analysis of the actions and decisions of the commanders and armies involved, one noticeable strength of the book is its organization. The use of footnotes on each page instead of endnotes, is particularly notable and certainly a plus. The Snake Creek discussion mentioned before is just one example where such notes add insight and information. They are much easier to follow than are endnotes that require flipping back and forth, sometimes between hundreds of pages.

This work starts off strongly, making a good first impression with an introductory section entitled Dramatist Personae, which introduces the primary actors in the play that follows. 

It then touches on some early military action in the region, weeks before the generally accepted campaign start date of early May and continues to examine the leaders who would make the decisions in the upcoming weeks, such as a review of the team of U.S. Grant and William Sherman as their roles and responsibilities changed in the months before this contest started, as well as the Army of Tennessee’s leadership change from Braxton Bragg to Joseph Johnston. The author then examines the morale and condition of the men and armies that would soon face each other. Overall, the initial eight chapters perform a valuable duty in setting the stage for the upcoming battlefield drama.

I also enjoyed the decision to include many short chapters instead of fewer long ones. This adds to the readability and helps the narrative to flow smoothly and match the battlefield events as they developed.

Starting with chapter nine, the text switches focus to the actual military happenings of the start of the campaign, including the choices, maneuvers, and fighting that made up the first three weeks of this long contest. It is within these chapters that this work perhaps shines brightest. The details of the events of the campaign combine with analysis of these stories and sources to weave a mountain of information into a functioning and readable book.

The author used many sources - period records, writings, articles, and publications, along with modern scholarly works and others - to uncover information, but finding those reports means little without an understanding of what they mean. To me, the analysis and interpretation of the sources is among the most impressive pieces of this work - how he combines so many sources, often containing conflicting or sometimes missing information (such as the attempts to calculate casualties of the engagements), with his interpretation, to create a cohesive narrative of the story of this campaign. Even when sources are not clear, he explains why he uses them or interprets them a certain way. What first grabbed my attention in this regard was footnote 3 on page 322, when he acknowledges the possibly questionable credibility of a journal, but chose to use it as he believed that section of the writing to be accurate. Similar situations take place later in this work as well. To me this was a bit like “seeing how the sausage is made” - the author did not just find a source and automatically accept it, but, instead, analyzed it while acknowledging that some uncertainty exists, showing the readers why he included that information instead of just letting it go unquestioned. That hints at the type of thought and effort that went into this project.

One part of this book that did catch me off guard was the unexpected appearance of chapter 27, "Supplying Sherman: "I Will Eat Your Mules." It is a noteworthy section of the book, full of important information about the logistics of Sherman's planned campaign and the potential challenges thereof. What surprised me was that it immediately followed eighteen chapters of military action and proceeded five other such sections. This placement in the midst of the discussion of the movements and clashes of the armies confused me. It would have been terrific, perhaps ideal, as chapter 9, between the talk of the men and the the fields where they met, as part of the setup to the campaign, or perhaps at the end of the book, after the talk of the fighting and right before the final chapter, but as I read the book it seemingly came out of nowhere and then disappeared again. Perhaps I am overlooking some painfully obvious reason for its placement, and I do not intend this as heavy criticism, more of an admission of my own confusion, a minor blip in a terrific work. That said, it is one of the better chapters of the book, so I am much more pleased that it is included than I am surprised by when and where it came. 

Chapter 33, “Assessment,” also deserves acknowledgement. As its name declares, it wraps up the military situation of the campaign as of May 19. It is the logical and ideal way to conclude a work like this. It includes a noteworthy wrap-up of the Confederate behavior at Cassville, “the most enigmatic incident” of the campaign to this point. The indecision at this town was “a quintessential Army of Tennessee moment: confusion among the army’s leadership, plans going awry, arguments, and in the end, another morale-destroying retreat.” (p.545). That type of description fills much of this book,

This chapter also looks at the Union performance to this point as well, though with a more positive outlook, reflecting the results of the confrontations up to this stage of the fight for Atlanta.

A helpful order of battle, always important in a battle or campaign study, then follows, as do the bibliography and the index. 

This book is long,  545 pages through the final chapter, before the order of battle, bibliography, and index, but I found it to be a quick read.  More importantly, though, it is an extremely good read, and I expect others will enjoy it as well. Even knowing there are four more volumes to follow, and the possible future commitment that implies, this is certainly a work that those who enjoy studying the Civil War should read.

Book Discussion: Antietam Crossroads of Freedom

Antietam: Crossroads of Freedom: The Battle that Changed the Course of the Civil War

James M. McPherson 

copyright 2002

Oxford University Press

 

When I buy a book, I usually read it, then place it back on my shelf. Occasionally I will grab a book to try to find a phrase or claim I remember in the book or to clarify my memory on some subject, but very rare is the book that I read a second time.

Antietam: Crossroads of Freedom became one of those rare books. I read and enjoyed it a few years ago, but have now just re-read it as part of the "Let's Talk about it: Making Sense of the American Civil War" series I have mentioned here before. 

As expected, this book is very readable and informative, written in a style as most of McPherson's books are. It is only 156 pages long as well, so it is a quick read too.

I've entitled this post as a "discussion" instead of a review as I expect this to be more of an exploration of my thoughts of the message of the book than of a more traditional review. I'll try to keep it at a reasonable length and not touch on most of the many other points that can contribute to these thoughts. (I'm even leaving out any talk of  Gettysburg as the turning point - please pick yourselves up off the floor after reading that if the shock overcomes you.)

My main question about this book is if Antietam is truly the turning point of the war as McPherson contends. He does a good job of showing the mood in the north in the months before the war, with the great concern after the failure of the Peninsula Campaign and the route of Second Bull Run. Some leaders in Great Britain and other European countries were watching events closely and momentum seemed to be favoring either recognition of the Confederacy by those countries, or intervention into the war. 

Then Lee's army invaded Maryland. That should have been no way to improve Northern morale.

At this point, the book describes the action of the battle itself, from the famous "lost orders" to George McClellan's equally famous lack of aggressiveness. McPherson shows how that, even before the battle, the Union forces had experienced a sudden improvement in their morale, and were ready for the challenge of a battle on what they considered their territory. This contributed to the ferocity of the fighting, and after the fighting ended, many Union survivors were ready to pursue their enemy and try to inflict even more punishment on them.

McPherson then presents his arguments about Antietam's importance to the outcome of the war, and they are familiar - the Confederates returned to Virginia, Lincoln had the opportunity to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, and foreign recognition of the Confederacy suddenly became unlikely, if not impossible.

They are good, strong arguments, but I'm not sure I agree with them. 

For one, the war was only one-and-a-half years old when this fight took place, yet lasted two-and-a-half years more afterwards. Can it be a turning point if the event lasts longer after it occurs? 

I suppose that raises the question of what is a turning point, as well as the difference between A turning point and THE turning point. 

Also, if Antietam is a turning point because it ended the hopes of foreign recognition of the Confederacy, that implies an assumption that the Confederacy could only win the war with such recognition. Though time proved the Confederates did not get such recognition and did not win the war, I am not convinced that the failure to obtain such recognition doomed the Confederacy. I believe they still had the possibility of gaining victory without foreign intervention. During the summer and early fall of 1864, the Confederates had inflicted many casualties on Union forces in Virginia and had frustrated their foes elsewhere, particularly in the Union's attempt to approach Atlanta. Europe did not offer recognition, but the Confederate armies still bogged the Union armies down and the lack of progress on the part of the Northern forces frustrated and aggravated people at home. Doubt about the war's outcome began to build, and even President Lincoln looked unfavorably at his chances of re-election.

I can understand listing Antietam as one of many turning points in the war, though perhaps that cheapens the importance of whatever is meant by "turning point." In the discussion of THE turning point, my interpretation is of THE moment or event after which Union victory was inevitable. In that regard, I turn back to the middle and end of 1864, and contend that Lincoln's re-election in 1864 was the key event in showing that the Union would prevail. William T. Sherman's capture of Atlanta certainly aided Lincoln's re-election and I have often thought that event was the key, but now I believe the actual election result was the symbol and sign that the northern people were not succumbing to war-weariness; they did not elect a candidate whose party favored peace at almost any cost; they decided to continue fighting until success came.  This spirit displayed by the Northern people dismayed many in the south, and destroyed Southern hopes that the Confederacy could win simply by outlasting the north. The supposed "mechanics" "hirelings" and "wage slaves" of the North had shown a more persistent fighting spirit than their enemies had expected.

That - the failure to injure Northern morale badly enough to convince Northerners to give up on the war - was more important than the failure to get European of the Confederacy as a separate nation. Or at least it was as important, but it was not, at least in my understanding, less important to the Confederacy's chances of victory.

Of course, the "turning point" issue is one of the many questions that will in all likelihood always spur debate on the Civil War and McPherson's book does add to that discussion. It may create new thoughts and perspective too. In high school, I bought the "Gettysburg as the high-water mark" turning-point view, have sometimes accepted the points McPherson makes in his book about Antietam and its aftermath, and have also given thought to Sherman's Atlanta campaign as the so-called "turning point" before settling (at least for now) on Lincoln's re-election as the true key "moment" that demonstrated how the war would eventually end. 

Although I may not agree now  with McPherson's arguments, I thoroughly enjoyed this book and his analysis. I'm glad I read it again and look forward to the discussion it creates at our next "Let's Talk About it" session tomorrow night.