Showing posts with label George McClellan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label George McClellan. Show all posts

Monday, June 15, 2015

Book Review: Partners in Command by Joseph Glatthaar


Partners in Command: The Relationships Between Leaders in the Civil War
copyright 1994.
The Free Press

Partners in Command,  by Joseph Glatthaar, the author of fine works such as Forged in Battle and The March to the Sea and Beyond is the latest book I have read, and it is a good one. 

This book is both enjoyable and informative. Glatthaar has a nice writing style and his analysis throughout the book is impressive. The book details how various personalities and egos worked well or poorly with each other and also demonstrates how the military philosophies of the individuals did or did not mesh. Often these were clashes or accords of both personalities and military styles. Glatthaar's understandable way of telling and analyzing these stories makes this a pleasant book to read.

The relationships he chose to discuss in this book, giving each its own chapter, were those between Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson; Abraham Lincoln and George McClellan; Jefferson Davis and Joseph Johnston; Ulysses S. Grant and Wiliam Sherman; Grant, Sherman and David Dixon Porter; and Lincoln and Grant.

All were fine choices and made for entertaining and insightful reading, but I wish he had found room for even more. To his credit, the author mentioned in the preface that he also wished he had additional
 space and he suggested partnerships between Davis and Lee, Davis and Braxton Bragg and Grant and Henry Halleck among others worth discussing. Each one he mentioned would have been a great addition to this book, though I think analysis involving Bragg would have been especially fascinating.

Of the relationships he examined, I especially enjoyed the chapter on Davis and Johnston. His description of the difference between each one's preferred military strategies (Davis the politician wanted to protect as much territory as possible while Johnston the soldier preferred concentrating forces even if it meant leaving territory undefended) while showing how they shared similar personality flaws, especially their struggles to handle criticism, was excellent. It was not just a "personality clash" between these two. I also thought the chapter concerning Grant, Sherman and Porter stood out, explaining how the army generals cooperated with the admiral and how all three benefitted from and contributed to the effectiveness of their relationships, with Grant and Porter being business-like  professionals while Sherman and Porter had a more personal relationship.

This last point was one of this book's strengths, as the author pointed out that not all of these relationships were the same - some, like the one between Lee and Jackson were pure military partnerships existing only because of and for their military positions while others became more personal friendships, such as the one between Grant and Sherman.

Another part of this book was the appendix discussing McClellan and modern psychology, describing a couple of possible diagnoseses of Liitle Mac to try to explain the general's failure to be a more effective leader.

Overall, even though this book is now more than twenty years old, I enjoyed it and found it to be a good approach to an interesting topic. I would very much enjoy a "part 2" with explorations of even more such partnerships and I do recommend this book to anyone interested in the Civil War.

Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Horsing Around: Some Thoughts on the Democratic Party Before the 1864 Election

With the 150th anniversary of the historic 1864 Presidential election approaching quickly, I have recently discovered some information I did not know before, and also confirmed some understanding of the Democratic Part issues that I had not thought about lately.

One tidbit that especially intrigued me was that the chairman of the 1864 Democratic Convention was August Belmont, who owned successful horse breeding farms in New York and Kentucky. Horse racing fans know that the third race of the sport's "Triple Crown" is the Belmont Stakes, now held at Belmont Park in New York. This race was named for August Belmont. Those interested in his career in the horse industry and the vast influence he wielded in it should read How Kentucky Became Southern by MaryJean Wall. It is a fine book about Kentucky history and memory, and frequently discusses Belmont's horse breeding business, which shifted between Kentucky and New York.

More information on the history of Belmont Stakes, though not with a lot of details of its namesake can also be found right here as well as on other links on that page. A longer, more detailed article, including information on his financial career and actions during the war years is at this link.

In the political arena, Belmont favored prosecuting the war before any reunion with the Confederate states, while the most vocal, and perhaps best-known, Democrat, Clement Vallandigham, preferred to end the war and reunite the nation immediately. This was the "peace without victory" philosophy that Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate George Pendleton also shared.

The party's Presidential nominee, General George B. McClellan, opposed this concept and his letter accepting the party's nomination repudiated the party's "peace plank" that was a key part of the party's platform. This led Vallindigham to refuse to campaign for McClellan.  This fissure was not as severe as the one the party faced in 1860 when it divided into two factions that each nominated its own candidate, but it does show that 4 years of time had only shifted the internal argument from one between Northern and Southern Democrats to one between War and Peace Democrats, and from how government should or could handle slavery to whether or not to continue the war effort.

August Belmont, courtesy newyorksocialdiary.com

Wednesday, December 28, 2011

Designs of the Abolitionists

From the Covington Journal of December 28,1861 comes this piece.

Perhaps the coolest thing since the war began, says the Chicago Times, is the purpose of the Abolitionists to convert the army, three quarters of whom are Democrats, into an instrumentality of Abolition. It is in prosecution of this purpose that the onslaught alluded to by our Washington correspondent is made upon Gen. McClellan. The Abolitionists understand that they cannot convert him into such an instrumentality, and believing that, if they can depose him, they can capture the President, they have set all their dogs upon him. It does not occur to them that, when he shall be deposed by their machinations, three-quarters of the army will lay down their arms; or, if this does occur to them, they are utterly reckless of the consequences of it. Or possibly their contemplated remedy for such event is a proclamation of universal emancipation and the arming of the negroes. What a state of things we should have, to be sure, three months hence, if the Abolitionists should have there way.


George McClellan, courtesy mrlincolnswhitehouse.org

Monday, July 25, 2011

A fateful day of news briefs

These three items appeared in order in the July 27, 1861 edition of the Covington Journal.

Gen. McClellan has been summoned to Washington to take command of the army on the Potomac.

Gen. Rosecrans takes charge of the Federal forces in  Western Virginia.

Gen. Fremont passed through Cincinnati Wednesday evening to take command of the Western Division of the Federal army.


--
Perhaps not quite a day that "will live in infamy," but one that had major implications for the future

Monday, June 27, 2011

Book Review: The Class of 1846 by John C. Waugh



The Class of 1846: From West Point to Appomattox: Stonewall Jackson, George McClellan and Their Brothers
John C.Waugh
copyright 1994
Warner Books

I finished this fine book a couple of weeks ago and though I regret I cannot do a full review of it, I do want to offer at least a small review of it.

It is a good book, but long. At over 500 pages, it did take me quite a while to read it (outside distractions kept me from reading it as quickly as I wished), but that is not a bad thing. It is well-written and easy to read, so the length is not a major issue. 

This book serves almost as a mini-biography of several of the future soldiers, but especially McClellan and Jackson, for whom it describes their youth and their lives in between their time at West Point and the Civil War. They - the two most prominent members of the class - are certainly the two dominant figures in this book.

I enjoyed sketches of others as well though. I wish they had talked a bit more about A.P. Hill (though he was moved back to the class of 1847, he did start in the 1846 class), especially in the final days of his life. The same can be said about George Pickett.

At one point, the book had a nice discussion about Ambrose Burnside replacing McClellan late in 1862 and when the chapter ended, I was disappointed that the discussion about Burnside stopped too. Then I realized he was not part of this class, not even temporarily like Hill.

Waugh discusses their time at West Point, with the spartan lifestyle and he describe many of the teachers under whom the cadets studied. He mentions Benny Havens, of course, and the trouble associated with that tavern and related activities. He also describes the Mexican War, and the role many of these young men played in it.

Overall, I found this to be an enjoyable book, a pleasant read and an informative description of several future well-known Civil War generals.

Saturday, May 22, 2010

Book Review: West Pointers and the Civil War



author: Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh
copyright 2009
University of North Carolina Press



When I first began to read this book, it struck me as being a tough read, perhaps a bit too technical for my tastes, but after just a couple of minutes of reading, the author's style grew on me quickly and I found the book to be readable, enjoyable and informative. It was kind of unique in that regard, but I truly did start enjoying it more after I had warmed up to it briefly.

Hsieh's book tells the story of the development of the "old army" especially how it learned, developed and studied tactics, and, maybe just as importantly, how the army developed a nationalistic and fairly conservative culture that would play a big role in how the Civil War unfolded.

The author does a fine job of detailing how the American military's poor performance in the War of 1812 alarmed military leaders of the time and how they took steps to improve the military's efficiency, while fighting against an American tradition of disapproval of standing armies (or, as Hsieh calls it on page 2 "an Anglo-American martial tradition that had glorified the civic and military virtue of the studiously unprofessional citizen-soldier"). Despite this mistrust of standing armies and professionalized military men, the American leaders were able to learn from the British and French and begin to write their own tactical manuals for military use. A lot of these were simply translations from the French, but as time passed American military leaders, such as Winfield Scott, started making additions or changes to the French tactics, as they deemed necessary due to the unique features of American geography.

When war with Mexico broke out in the mid-1840s, Hsieh points out that the U.S. Army performed much better than it had in the previous nation-state war with Britain, giving the army as an institution more confidence in its concept of professionalism.

What I found most fascinating about the book however, was when it got to the Civil War. The old army had developed a very conservative, nationalistic culture and tradition. The author shows examples of army officers in the 1850s following orders they may not have agreed with because it was their duty, and then shows how this mindset affected men deciding which side to support during the Civil War. Not all officers who had interests in the South automatically left the army to fight for this new nation; several stayed with the Union, supporting their country and army as they had learned to in the antebellum years. 

The prime examples of how this conservative mindset are well ilustrated by the author. He begins the book with a look at Robert E. Lee's refusal to resort to guerrilla warfare in the post-Appomattox days, and then discusses George McClellan's mindset (along with that of his followers and admirers, even amongst army men) during the war - the unwillingness to attack slavery being the primary motive. Hsieh points out that this was not necessarily an act of treason as many radical Republicans assumed, but rather an extension of the mindset and culture the old army had created among many of its officers. 

Hsieh also does a wonderful job of showing how McClellan basically fathered the Army of the Potomac, leaving his conservatism as part of the inheritance the army gained after his departure. Even the arrival of Ulysses Grant could not totally overcome the basic mindset that this Eastern army had learned from its original commander. I found this to be an especially interesting point, with good examples cited by the author.

Perhaps the main point of Hsieh's work is that the Civil War unfolded as it did because of two main factors: 1.The predominance of men of military and West Point (including other military schools such as Virgina Military Institute) backgrounds in positions of influence of both sides and 2. the fairly conservative culture these men learned and took to battle with them. With both Union and Confederate military leaders having such similar backgrounds, it is not surprising that both sides had similar military competence and similar strategies during the war. Of course, not everything was exactly the same on both side, but each side did fight a "nation-state" type of war instead of resorting to guerrilla action, as each side had a goal of having organized nation states after the war. Had one side done something radically different than the other, such as widespread guerrilla warfare, the war would likely have taken on a different form, but both sides had similar training and similar goals.  These commonalities led to a long, bloody war, with neither side having a dominant advantage over the other in military expertise, strategy or morale, as the Americans had had in the Mexican War. This explains the relative scarcity of "decisive victories" from either side during the war.

After reading this book, I found that the phrase "brother's war" has new meaning to me - not only does it refer to the familial connections of sibling taking each side, as most people use it to mean, but I can now see it as showing how the split of "West Point brothers" as they may be called had such a direct influence on the type and length of the war as well. Looking at the graduates of West Point as a type of  family is a perspective I had not thought about prior to reading this book.

Another point made throughout the book, especially regarding the Mexican War and the Civil War was that war is more than an act of technology and tactics. As Hsieh pointed out on page 158 "The Minie bullet and the trench certainly had a profound effect on battlefield conditions during this period, but all those effects had to be channeled through a military machinery grounded as much in flesh and blood as in lead and cordite." It was this "flesh and blood" military machine that he discussed throughout the book that had the biggest impact in how the Civil War developed. As he wrote on page 176 to back up this point: "More goes into war than the technical qualities of arms and ordnance - much still depends on the uncontrollable vagaries of Fortune, the ill-defined courage of the contending men-at-arms, and the basic competence of the leaders on hand."

I must confess that I found this a hard review to write, though I know not why. Hsieh's telling of the story of the development of the American army and how this process influenced the Civil War is a fascinating one and probably has too many interesting points for me to mention here. One part of the book I really like is the detailed end-notes at the end of the book - many of them provide other information or points worth considering.  

This is definitely a book Civil War students, especially those interested in the military side of the war, should consider having on their bookshelf.

(As always, this review is done on my own time and with no compensation from anyone. All opinions are simply my own thoughts expressed by my own will. Thank you for reading it.)